ON THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA
The presence of deliberative bodies in India can be traced back to ancient times when local public assemblies (janapadas and janasanghas) existed where citizens would gather to decide on the provision of public goods and public issues. While many prevalent historians such as K.P. Jayaswal posit that the existence of such bodies evidence the presence of democracy in ancient India, the inclusion of marginalized groups in these bodies is ambiguous. Some scholars have tied verses of the Mahabarata, a renown Indian religious text, that describe bodies of, “persons that are equal to one another in family and in blood” to descriptions of janapadas and janasanghas (Sarkisyanz, 1965). However, the presence of the caste system in India (delineated by famous religious texts such as the Vedas) casts doubts on the meaning of such a phrase. No formal record exists that proves provisions for the devolution of power, but there was always a sense of involvement in governance even at the level of the common man, so that “while a particular varna was entitled to rule, the Kshatriyas, the power was shared by the whole community” (Altekar, 2001). However, famous religious and cultural texts such as the Vedas depict non-monarchical governments and republican politics (Datta, 2019). Similarly, the tenets of Buddhism depict a country where groups of individuals employed a public decision making process using assemblies or parliaments (Rhys Davids, 1903). However, as is the plight of capitalism and globalization today, economic expansion enabled new groups to take up arms and demand a share in sovereignty (Forrest, 1996).
The resurgence of deliberative democracy and empowered governance occurred when leaders of the nationalist movement, including Mahatma Gandhi, recognized the role of villagers in governance and development of their own affairs. Gandhi preached the importance of village swaraj, which translates to “self-rule”, saying, “that true democracy could not be worked by some persons sitting at the top. It had to be worked from below by the people of every village” (Datta, 2017b). However, deliberative democracy lost its momentum between 1940 and 1970 due to the sociopolitical climate of the world at the time including the, “chill of censorship during the World War and Cold War period, and the rise of neoliberal ideology” (Datta, 2019). In the 1970s consumer advocacy movements sparked a resurgence of grassroots involvement in governance. Overall, institutions of deliberative democracy have graced India in phases, but notions of democracy and governance by villagers have existed since ancient times.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATION IN INDIA
Institutions of deliberative democracy and empowered governance are woven into the constitutional framework of the nation of India. The government of India implemented the local government system in the constitution (implemented in 1950) in which different states were given the power to engender separate laws for their own local governance policies. Different states therefore adopted different means of implementing EDD. In Karnataka, they implemented Gram Sabhas (GS) in the Panchayat Act of Karnataka, to act as bodies of social audit for the decisions of individual Panchayats. Similarly in Bombay, the Bombay Gram Panchayat Act of 1959 issued that GS must meet twice a year, and in these meetings Gram Panchayats were to place before the GS statements of accounts, development and other proposals for review. However, studies observed that meetings were sparsely attended and that the outcomes of deliberations were rarely achieved (Diwakar, 1963). Due to ambiguity in the constitution on how deliberative democracy should be implemented and the freedom for each state to execute their own implementation of EDD, these institutions took many forms with a variety of structural characteristics that were not particularly effective until the amendment of the constitution in 1992.
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were made to bring about uniform structure in local governance amongst states in India. The Seventy third amendment act institutes a 3 tier structure for rural local government where the highest tier is at the district level and the lowest one at the village level (Datta, 2019). The middle tier is called the mandal panchayat or panchayat samiti. This system implements a hierarchical framework for institutional deliberative democracy that both divests power and seeks to provide structure for success and moderation. The Gram Sabha (GS) has the authority to exercise power and perform functions at the village level as the legislature of the state enables.
Duties of the GS include auditing annual statements of accounts and annual reports of administration of the GP in the last financial year, identifying the beneficiaries of anti-poverty and rural development programs and scrutinizing the on-going and completed schemes of the GP (Datta, 2019). Most importantly, none of the state acts gives the GS power to exercise control over the GP and override decisions made by local bodies on village development, preventing the usurpation of power. “The amendment defines panchayat bodies as institutions of self-government and as instruments of planning for economic development and social justice. Thus, the GS is an institution of participatory democracy. It is an institution in the hands of people to air their grievances and keep watch and vigil on the functioning of the GPs” (Datta, 2019). Notably, the Ministry of Panchayats has taken many steps to ensure that the instances of deliberative democracy are empowered; the grant size of GPs has been enhanced, and to provide structure the 14th Finance Commission has stated that grants to local bodies must go towards bolstering the delivery of basic services including but not limited to water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, street lighting, roads, parks, and burial grounds. There are approximately a quarter million village panchayats in India, which highlights the importance of scale in implementing institutional deliberative democracy and the decentralization of power.
A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON GRAM SABHAS IN INDIA
Gram Sabhas are institutional structures of deliberative democracy, but their efficacy in encouraging participation and promoting economic development using grassroots level governance nested within a larger institutional framework is to be determined based on empirical studies. According to studies conducted in major states, GS meetings are not being held regularly and a meager 13 percent of villagers attend the meetings (according to the National Council of Applied Economic Research) (Das, 2015; Datta, 2003b). Attendance by women is reported to be as low as 7 percent. The attendance of both men and women seem to be affected by the gender of the head of the GP. Participatory Research in Asia conducted studies that showed that in as many states, for example. Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, while meetings are held regularly, quorum is often unobtained (Participatory Research in Asia, 1997). Furthermore, the study found that GS meetings were not effective in establishing village level priorities except in the case of Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. Lastly, it was found that there is no correlation between meeting attendance and land ownership, insinuating participation amongst rich and poor household (relatively) are equal; this debunks the idea that institutionalized empowered local participatory governance is sufficient in incentivizing the inclusion of poorer households. Generally, the findings are that GS meetings still need to gain momentum, and the main hurdles to this include the lack of political interest and legal inadequacies (Datta, 2019).
While Gram Sabhas are not yet entirely effective in functioning as institutions of empowered deliberative democracy, there are many positive implications of their implementation. For example, studies indicate that in regions where GS meetings are taking place, casteism and communalism are weakening due to increasing communication and intercourse of people across all castes and communities (Datta, 2019). It is noteworthy that uniting people through the commonality of their problems works against internalized cultural mechanisms of difference and fosters empathy. Another example is that of Devadasi women, who are essentially given in marriage to God. While the Devadasi practice used to be culturally significant and women who were appointed to the position were given high social status and respect, it now serves as a guise for sex slavery. The working of the GS in Karnataka villages has given women subjected to this traditional system of enslavement a voice to abolish this practice; Devadasi has been abolished in about 165 villages in the Belgaum district.
A FOCUS ON PANCHAYATI RAJ IN WEST BENGAL
On Structure and History
The structure of Panchayati Raj in West Bengal follows the 3 tier structure warranted by the 73rd constitutional amendment. The lowest tier, GP consists of ten to twelve villages of about 10,000 villagers and has fifteen to twenty seats of representatives that are elected every 5 years (Datta, 2019). The responsibilities of the GP align largely with those of the GP in the rest of India such as land reform, poverty alleviation, rural industrialization, etc. The intermediate tier governs a region of approximately 10 GPs, and is composed of approximately twenty to thirty elected members; the function of this body is to coordinate the activities of the GPs into a block plan. Lastly, the district-level body coordinates the plans of the various PS bodies in the district. This allows the individual grievances of villages to jump scale from the local to the district level.
Since the West Bengal Panchayat Act in 1973, the GS system has been implemented where village councils bear the responsibility for GP functionality. However, the institution of participatory governance was weak, as elections were not held for years and the system was dominated by local elites (Bhattacharya, 1997; Datta, 1997, 1998). However, when the Left Front gained political power in 1977, deliberative democracy was reintroduced with new vigor – elections were held with open party participation to advocate for non-partisanship. This introduced a new wave of the Panchayats (one that was free from domination by rich landlords) and created a new class of rural leadership that gave voice and representation to the poor and marginalized populations. Many land reforms were implemented including acquisition of ceiling surplus land, redistribution of land to those that were not previously land-owners, and securing rights for sharecroppers; these significantly changed the rural socio-economic landscape, with 70% of agricultural land being owned by local farmers compared to the national average of 34.3% (Datta, 2019).
The support of the rural poor by the government both encouraged the underprivileged to raise their voices and participate more, which then resulted in honing the skill of participation. In tandem with encouragement of rural populations, the Left Front government focused on implementing a literacy program which caught on very well in West Bengal as evidenced by increased literacy rates in census data (Datta, 2019).
In 1988, the responsibility of implementing development programs was shifted from the state departments to the Panchayats. Simultaneously, the budgets of the Panchayats was doubled to almost 2 million per GP, creating a new sense of local empowerment to implement the results of their deliberations.
A Summary of Empirical Findings
Out of the 37,067 Gram Sansads, 72% of them held half-yearly meetings, and of these cases, quorum was not met at 12% of them. The average attendance was 142 individuals out of which only 39 were women. The percentage of postponed meetings was very high, especially in some districts such as Dakshin Dinajpur and Howrah (Datta, 2019). The involvement of women was marginal until the self help group movement inspired positive change (Datta, 2019).
A study by Ghatak was done on a cross section of 20 villages in May 1999 to examine the functionality of Gram Sansads (Ghatak, 2002). The study presents an occupational breakdown of the individuals attending the meetings: the largest category was agricultural laborers, while the second largest group was farmers with less than 2 acres of land. Notably, only 16% of individuals that attended had more than 2 acres of land or non-farming income. This resulted in a narrow scope of discussion in the meetings and a focus on tangible problems within the community such as road repair, the installation of wells, the doling out of loans, etc rather than abstract socioeconomic and political issues. Researchers also noticed participants actively demanding new projects and making suggestions on the allocation of funds – there was even deliberation on the specific design of certain projects and their execution.
Notably, the leaders of the assemblies and the local representatives are subject to scrutiny by the people, creating a system of accountability. Organizers must answer to the criticisms of individuals and “often face allegations about the misuse of funds and selection of beneficiaries” (Datta, 2019). The process of election ensures that all parties are held accountable. Another important finding was that those who participated were usually members of a political party – those that were apolitical had a tendency to avoid participation in the GS meetings. Lastly, a study done by Datta in 2000 shows that over a third of the villagers had no awareness of the Gram Sansad system, and that attendance to meetings was considered a low priority due to increased farm work and the notion that meetings did not influence the final decisions (Datta, 2001, 2009). This notion is grounded in the reality of many GS systems; a study done by Bhattacharya in 1998 found that the majority of decisions of the panchayats were made before the meetings by a sub-committee. Furthermore, GP members were reported for ignoring the actual deliberation and proceedings in Sansad meetings and being intolerant of opposing viewpoints.
A study done by Robert Thorlind shows that the Gram Sansads were not functioning effectively and require awareness among the marginalized classes and practical learning of democratic processes before they can become instruments for democratic accountability and participation (Thorlind, 2000).
A FOCUS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GS IN KERALA
Following in the footsteps of the Panchayati Raj of West Bengal, officials of Kerala attempted to implement the same methodology in their own state in 1996. The Communist Party of India (CPM) was in power at the time and pursued a system of empowered deliberative democracy with a focus on giving grassroots programs the resources to actually implement their ideas – under the program, 40% of the state’s budget would be reallocated from the state level to the village level Panchayats. However, the distribution of power was not implemented without regulation. Each village was tasked with producing a report that detailed the development plan using the available assets including but not limited to specified assessments of need, development reports, spending projects, supplemental financing, arrangements for deciding plan beneficiaries and monitoring of arrangements (Fung and Wright, 2003). To ensure that a focus on anti-poverty initiatives was not lost, a condition was implemented that 40-50% of funds was to be invested in some form of economic development, 40% had to be used towards social spending and slum improvement, 10% of funds had to be spent on programs to empower women, and a maximum of 30% could be allocated for roads (Fung and Wright, 2003).
Of the various regional implementations of the 73rd constitutional amendment that were implemented throughout India – deliberative democracy has seen the most success in the villages of Kerala. In conjunction with the 3 tier structure, working committees and development seminars are held to create accessible spaces of deliberation and planning (Parthasarathy, 2017). Instead of having open deliberation, those that attend the assemblies are divided into groups based on the theme of resources or committees, and sent off to deliberate until reaching a consensus on the appropriate and effective allocation of resources in the facet to which they were assigned. Furthermore, deliberation is bolstered by a variety of training programs to inform and instruct citizens on deliberative planning and effective execution of plans into public action. A study done by Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri using qualitative and quantitative data on 72 Gram Sabhas found that there was a positive correlation between the influence of the People’s Campaign in Kerala and the inclusion of women and ‘lower caste’ groups in decision making spaces. Gibson goes on to argue, based on this data, that the high level of participation by women is the reason for the effectiveness of GS in Kerala.
It is notable that while progress has been promising, there is still a long way to go before the system can be considered entirely ‘successful’: “while some villages produced what appear to be thoughtful plans with high levels of direct popular participation, many others failed to produce any plans at all. Of those plans that were submitted, many were poorly integrated and had poor credit and financing schemes, and the projects within them were sometimes ill-conceived” (Fung and Wright, 2003).