Reform Execution

Under the administration of Arbenz, indigenous Guatemalans saw major improvements to their living conditions. This, however, was not exclusively done by Arbenz. In order to execute his plan as efficiently as possible, the president created a series of hierarchical organizations with different responsibilities surrounding the Agrarian Reform Law (Handy, 1994).  The top tier of these organizations consisted of government officials, whose purpose was to oversee and manage specific sectors of the law’s implementation at the national level (Handy, 1994). The name of these organizations were the National Agrarian Department and National Agrarian Council. Because of the nature of these two organizations, the form of participation that took place could be considered informing, which Arstein (1969) defines as “informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options… However, too frequently the emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information – from officials to citizens – with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation” (Arstein, 1969: 8). Since the focus of these organizations was to implement laws for citizens and to ensure the laws functioned for them, there was very limited space for citizens to provide feedback on how the reform could be improved. Citizens were informed of their rights through national publications (Handy, 1994).

Fortunately, the bottom tier organizations, named the Departmental Agrarian Committee (CAD) and the Local Agrarian Committee (CAL), had a more intimate relationship with the citizens of Guatemala (Handy, 1994). The function of these organizations was to have transparent participation for campesino workers, ensuring that the agrarian land reform was processed from the bottom up. Instead of the Guatemalan government forcefully occupying and redistributing land from elites, the task was left for campesinos, who, through the use of bottom tier organizations, could gain access to land. As stated by Gleijeses (1989), “Any person who thought he was entitled, could petition the CAL for land which he considered eligible for expropriation. The CAL would assess the validity of the request and forward its recommendation to the Departmental Agrarian Committee” (Gleijeses, 1989: 460-461). The purpose of the CAD and CAL was essentially to function as a direct link between campesinos and governmental power. Whenever a campesino desired a plot of land from an elite, they used these local organizations as a method of accessing legal power to expropriate the land. Thus, land redistribution was fully done by campesino workers. The CAD and CAL only interfered with campesino petitions when they were considered invalid or unjustified (Gleijeses, 1989).

This bottom-up method of land redistribution was brilliant. Through the framework analysis of Arstein (1969), the participation implemented by the bottom tier organizations can be defined as delegated power. Delegated power is when “negotiations between citizens and public officials can also result in citizens achieving dominant decision-making authority over a particular plan or program” (Arstein, 1969: 15). Citizens, specifically Guatemalan campesinos, had the ability to choose which sectors of land would be expropriated. The CAD and CAL served to give campesino petitions the governmental power to expropriate land owned by wealthy elites. Although the CAL and CAD had the ultimate authority over whether a campesino’s petition was valid or not, campesinos dominated the decision-making process of land reform in Guatemala.

Deliberation, as defined by Patrick Heller and Vijayendra Rao (2015), between Arbenz’s administration and opposing political parties was common, but ineffective (Handy, 1994). Throughout the ten years of spring, right-winged political parties and wealthy elites tried slowing the changes caused by the Agrarian Reform Law. Arbenz was often taken to court where he was forced to listen to right-winged complaints about the reform (Gleijeses, 1989). Fortunately for Arbenz’s administration, these deliberative meetings were ineffective, as nothing was done to lower right-wing and elite concerns about the Agrarian Reform Law (Gleijeses, 1989). This is because Arbenz’s government knew what they wanted in regards to campesino workers and land rights. Because opposing political parties only wanted to reduce the reform’s power, they were often ignored in deliberative spaces.

Campesinos and Reform

Not only did the Arbenz’s administration Agrarian Reform Law stimulate participation of Guatemalan campesinos, but it did so in a way that made them aware of their social power and needs. Quoting Gleijeses, “In Fortuny’s words, ‘We proposed the creation of peasant committees in order to lay the groundwork for the eventual radicalization of the peasantry’” (Gleijeses, 1989: 461). The Arbenz administration wanted to raise working-class consciousness and improve the sociological imagination of Guatemalans so that they man radicalize. Because land reform heavily relied on the action of rural Guatemalans, it was necessary for them to understand their circumstances and be radical about them. This was done so they may continue pushing towards social changes. As Mills (2000) states, the sociological imagination enables one to understand the larger historical scene in which they live, and how that influences their lives and those around them. It is crucial for one to have this awareness to understand the context of their reality. For the case of the campesino, their bodies and their land were exploited for the economic benefit of wealthy elites. Under this context, campesino workers would be less likely to submit to exploitative landowners (Gleijeses, 1989).

The stimulation of campesino workers’ sociological imagination under Arbenz’s administration was very effective, so much so that approximately 100,000 families gained land after the reform (exact numbers are unknown) (Gleijeses, 1989). Additionally, to reduce land reform, opposing political parties and elites claimed that the CAL and campesino workers were being violent (Gleijeses, 1989). Although the claim of “violence” was an exaggeration for political purposes (Gleijeses, 1989), this claim suggests that after Arbenz’s reform, campesino mobilizing efforts against landowning elites grew.

Although Arbenz may be credited for propelling land redistribution, it is important to acknowledge that land rights activism preceded his administration; campesino workers have always been at the forefront of this struggle. This is because of their resistance and project identity in relation to Guatemalan society. As Castells (2010) states, resistance identities go against what legitimizing identities consider to be “normal.” For the case of Guatemala, wealthy elites dominate the country. Therefore, they established a system that exploits marginalized communities for the benefit of elites. Subsequently, campesino workers were placed in conditions that caused their resistance identity to transform into a project identity because they began pushing to redefine their position in society through activism and grassroots organizing (Castells, 2010). The Ejército General de los Pobres (EGP), Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), and the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) are some indigenous organizations that fought for Guatemalan land rights before the administration of Arbenz (U.S. Gov. Printing Office, 1981). These organizations focused on radicalizing and arming indigenous populations to strengthen the land movement within the country. During the ten years of spring, they brought the land rights struggle to the forefront, causing the implementation of the Agrarian Land Reform (Gleijeses, 1989).