INTRODUCTION

With increasing globalization, the scope of development has shifted away from a sole focus on economic growth and capital accumulation to include the broader consideration of social, economic and cultural equality. Working within the capitalist framework that permeates most developing nations today, citizen participation that gives agency to individuals has proven to result in a redistributive and welfarist state and cultivate more robust and equitable development than accumulationist strategies of development.

In my paper I will examine the impact of lower-class mobilization and citizen participation in anti-poverty initiatives in India. More specifically, I will examine the efficacy of empowered participatory governance (EPG) or empowered deliberative democracy (EDD) in robust development and redistribution of power – both social and economic. I will go on to examine how the dynamics of power and authority intermix with techniques for the successful implementation of EDD in specific case studies such as Kerala and West Bengal.

THEORIES ON DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

In a world where the spread of capitalism and globalization threatens to exacerbate inequality, policies that seek to reimagine the nature of citizen participation as it relates to democratic governance have the potential to redistribute resources and capital back to poor and marginalized individuals. Participatory local governance could be the key to more inclusive and robust forms of development, where the rift between regular people and the institutions that govern their lives is bridged by linking participation to the state at a local level. The notion of ‘deepening democracy’ through programs of decentralized governance empowers individuals to make allocative decisions predicated on their own lived experience of needs and shortcomings – it allows them to use available resources to fill in the gaps where the bureaucratic nature of government has failed them (Heller and Rao, 2015).

However, it is crucial to consider what the building blocks are of creating deliberative systems that effectively interface with the state at a grassroots level. Gaventa poses six propositions that are fundamental to productively implementing participatory local governance: (1) closing the gap between the poor and institutions that govern their lives, (2) building relationships between citizens and their local governments through new forms of participation, accountability and responsiveness, (3) rethinking how citizens voices are represented in the political process using the idea of empowered deliberative democracy, (4) learning about positive and negative outcomes dynamically and focusing on the extent outcomes have been realized (5) Building conditions for success of empowered deliberative democracy (EDD), and (6) contesting the ‘local’ in the era of globalization by examining the agenda of actors that promote participatory discourse, and ensuring that it results in genuine opportunities for democracy building at the local level. (Gaventa, 2001).

Empowered deliberative democracy is a participatory process that relies on the participation and capacity of ordinary people, cultivates outcomes from reason-based decision making, and ties results to action (Gaventa, 2001). It breeds accountability, inclusion, and mobilization with real power to influence institutions and policies using a bottom-up approach. It is important to consider, as Gaventa postulates in his fifth proposition, what the conditions for success are in implementing and maintaining EDD. Gaventa also notes Heller’s work suggests that the three enabling conditions of participatory governance are a strong central state capacity, well developed civil society and an organized political force with strong social movement characteristics. The implications of these conditions see their impact in the replicability of EDD – they are not broadly generalizable but rather require some institutional structures for success. Furthermore, Fung and Wright delineate three principles that are fundamental to EDD and institutional building respectively. The principles of EDD are a focus on specific and real problems, the involvement of individuals affected by these problems and relevant officials, and the use of deliberative development as a tool to derive solutions to these problems. (Fung and Wright, 2003). Fung and Wright go on to state that the design principles of EDD or EPG are the devolution of public decision making authority, formal linkages or responsibility, resource distribution and communication, and the use and generation of new state institutions to support and guide these efforts.

While empowered deliberative democracy in theory works to diffuse state power and resources in a meaningful way to combat inequality, in what ways can the outcomes be measured as they pertain to the goals of citizen participation and participatory local governance? Fung and Wright provide a metric to relate case studies to the model of EPG, in which there are six critical dimensions of fit: (1) how genuinely deliberative the actual decision making process is, (2) how effectively decisions are translated into action, (3) the extent to which deliberative bodies are able to effectively monitor the implementation of their decisions, (4) to what extent the reforms incorporate recombinant measures that coordinate the actions of local units and diffuse innovations (5) to what extent deliberative processes increase the deliberative capacities and dispositions of those who participate in them, and (6) whether the outcomes of the process are more desirable than those of prior institutional arrangements (Fung and Wright, 2003).

There are many favorable outcomes to empowered deliberative democracy, however it is important to consider its criticisms, especially in understanding where it has the potential to go wrong. Fung and Wright summarize the six critical drawbacks of EPG which can be abridged to concerns about vulnerability to domination of power within deliberative arenas by elites or factions, severe limitations imposed on the scope of deliberative decision and action by external actors and institutional contexts in the pursuit of self interest, unrealistic expectations of commitment in climates of civic and political apathy, and long term sustainability. Silver, Scott and Kazepov (2010) also identify the unequal power of participants resulting from asymmetrical access to information and pre-existing class inequality. They suggest that there are means to combat power disparity amongst participants by implementing legal and regulatory reforms that systematically empower poor and marginalized groups. Examples of such legislation includes but is not limited to selecting convenient times and places for meetings (keeping in mind the schedule of the working individual), enforcing universal and inclusive civil rights, and using public funds to subsidize the operations of marginalized groups via organizations (Fung and Wright, 2003). As both Gaventa and Fung and Wright also posit, citizen participation is predicated on effective and robust social inclusion, which is quite a tall order. Initiatives taken to achieve such levels of social inclusion might constitute components of outreach, affirmative action or quotas (Fishkin, 1995; Cabannes, 2004; Avritzer, 2006; Sintomer et al., 2008 cited by Silver, Scott and Kazepov, 2010).

Lastly, it is important to consider the historical and political context of democracy within a state. With increasing globalization, nations have a tendency to shift their political systems towards democracy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) influxes. The issue of whether institutions of democracy can truly take root in former communist countries is still largely uncharted territory, especially with respect to deliberative systems. However, democratization has been shown to be an issue even in non-communist nations with weakly institutionalized democratic institutions or no historical tradition of democratic rule (Heller and Rao, 2015). Therefore, along with Heller and Rao’s 3 criterion for a state’s successful implementation of EDD, cultural context and pre-existing institutional structures play a crucial role in the effectiveness of implementing empowered deliberative democracy from both a bottom-up and top-down perspective.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN INDIA – THE CASE OF GRAM SABHAS OF KERALA IN INDIA AND PANCHAYATI RAJ IN WEST BENGAL

ON THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

The presence of deliberative bodies in India can be traced back to ancient times when local public assemblies (janapadas and janasanghas) existed where citizens would gather to decide on the provision of public goods and public issues.  While many prevalent historians such as K.P. Jayaswal posit that the existence of such bodies evidence the presence of democracy in ancient India, the inclusion of marginalized groups in these bodies is ambiguous. Some scholars have tied verses of the Mahabarata, a renown Indian religious text, that describe bodies of, “persons that are equal to one another in family and in blood” to descriptions of janapadas and janasanghas (Sarkisyanz, 1965). However, the presence of the caste system in India (delineated by famous religious texts such as the Vedas) casts doubts on the meaning of such a phrase. No formal record exists that proves provisions for the devolution of power, but there was always a sense of involvement in governance even at the level of the common man, so that “while a particular varna was entitled to rule, the Kshatriyas, the power was shared by the whole community” (Altekar, 2001). However, famous religious and cultural texts such as the Vedas depict non-monarchical governments and republican politics (Datta, 2019). Similarly, the tenets of Buddhism depict a country where groups of individuals employed a public decision making process using assemblies or parliaments (Rhys Davids, 1903). However, as is the plight of capitalism and globalization today, economic expansion enabled new groups to take up arms and demand a share in sovereignty (Forrest, 1996).

The resurgence of deliberative democracy and empowered governance occurred when leaders of the nationalist movement, including Mahatma Gandhi, recognized the role of villagers in governance and development of their own affairs. Gandhi preached the importance of village swaraj, which translates to “self-rule”, saying, “that true democracy could not be worked by some persons sitting at the top. It had to be worked from below by the people of every village” (Datta, 2017b).  However, deliberative democracy lost its momentum between 1940 and 1970 due to the sociopolitical climate of the world at the time including the, “chill of censorship during the World War and Cold War period, and the rise of neoliberal ideology” (Datta, 2019). In the 1970s consumer advocacy movements sparked a resurgence of grassroots involvement in governance. Overall, institutions of deliberative democracy have graced India in phases, but notions of democracy and governance by villagers have existed since ancient times.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATION IN INDIA

Institutions of deliberative democracy and empowered governance are woven into the constitutional framework of the nation of India. The government of India implemented the local government system in the constitution (implemented in 1950) in which different states were given the power to engender separate laws for their own local governance policies. Different states therefore adopted different means of implementing EDD. In Karnataka, they implemented Gram Sabhas (GS) in the Panchayat Act of Karnataka, to act as bodies of social audit for the decisions of individual Panchayats. Similarly in Bombay, the Bombay Gram Panchayat Act of 1959 issued that GS must meet twice a year, and in these meetings Gram Panchayats were to place before the GS statements of accounts, development and other proposals for review. However, studies observed that meetings were sparsely attended and that the outcomes of deliberations were rarely achieved (Diwakar, 1963). Due to ambiguity in the constitution on how deliberative democracy should be implemented and the freedom for each state to execute their own implementation of EDD, these institutions took many forms with a variety of structural characteristics that were not particularly effective until the amendment of the constitution in 1992.

The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were made to bring about uniform structure in local governance amongst states in India. The Seventy third amendment act institutes a 3 tier structure for rural local government where the highest tier is at the district level and the lowest one at the village level (Datta, 2019). The middle tier is called the mandal panchayat or panchayat samiti. This system implements a hierarchical framework for institutional deliberative democracy that both divests power and seeks to provide structure for success and moderation. The Gram Sabha (GS) has the authority to exercise power and perform functions at the village level as the legislature of the state enables.

Duties of the GS include auditing annual statements of accounts and annual reports of administration of the GP in the last financial year, identifying the beneficiaries of anti-poverty and rural development programs and scrutinizing the on-going and completed schemes of the GP (Datta, 2019). Most importantly, none of the state acts gives the GS power to exercise control over the GP and override decisions made by local bodies on village development, preventing the usurpation of power. “The amendment defines panchayat bodies as institutions of self-government and as instruments of planning for economic development and social justice. Thus, the GS is an institution of participatory democracy. It is an institution in the hands of people to air their grievances and keep watch and vigil on the functioning of the GPs” (Datta, 2019). Notably, the Ministry of Panchayats has taken many steps to ensure that the instances of deliberative democracy are empowered; the grant size of GPs has been enhanced, and to provide structure the 14th Finance Commission has stated that grants to local bodies must go towards bolstering the delivery of basic services including but not limited to water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, street lighting, roads, parks, and burial grounds. There are approximately a quarter million village panchayats in India, which highlights the importance of scale in implementing institutional deliberative democracy and the decentralization of power.

A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON GRAM SABHAS IN INDIA

Gram Sabhas are institutional structures of deliberative democracy, but their efficacy in encouraging participation and promoting economic development using grassroots level governance nested within a larger institutional framework is to be determined based on empirical studies. According to studies conducted in major states, GS meetings are not being held regularly and a meager 13 percent of villagers attend the meetings (according to the National Council of Applied Economic Research) (Das, 2015; Datta, 2003b). Attendance by women is reported to be as low as 7 percent. The attendance of both men and women seem to be affected by the gender of the head of the GP. Participatory Research in Asia conducted studies that showed that in as many states, for example. Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, while meetings are held regularly, quorum is often unobtained (Participatory Research in Asia, 1997). Furthermore, the study found that GS meetings were not effective in establishing village level priorities except in the case of Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. Lastly, it was found that there is no correlation between meeting attendance and land ownership, insinuating participation amongst rich and poor household (relatively) are equal; this debunks the idea that institutionalized empowered local participatory governance is sufficient in incentivizing the inclusion of poorer households. Generally, the findings are that GS meetings still need to gain momentum, and the main hurdles to this include the lack of political interest and legal inadequacies (Datta, 2019).

While Gram Sabhas are not yet entirely effective in functioning as institutions of empowered deliberative democracy, there are many positive implications of their implementation. For example, studies indicate that in regions where GS meetings are taking place, casteism and communalism are weakening due to increasing communication and intercourse of people across all castes and communities (Datta, 2019). It is noteworthy that uniting people through the commonality of their problems works against internalized cultural mechanisms of difference and fosters empathy. Another example is that of Devadasi women, who are essentially given in marriage to God. While the Devadasi practice used to be culturally significant and women who were appointed to the position were given high social status and respect, it now serves as a guise for sex slavery. The working of the GS in Karnataka villages has given women subjected to this traditional system of enslavement a voice to abolish this practice; Devadasi has been abolished in about 165 villages in the Belgaum district.

A FOCUS ON PANCHAYATI RAJ IN WEST BENGAL

On Structure and History

The structure of Panchayati Raj in West Bengal follows the 3 tier structure warranted by the 73rd constitutional amendment. The lowest tier, GP consists of ten to twelve villages of about 10,000 villagers and has fifteen to twenty seats of representatives that are elected every 5 years (Datta, 2019). The responsibilities of the GP align largely with those of the GP in the rest of India such as land reform, poverty alleviation, rural industrialization, etc. The intermediate tier governs a region of approximately 10 GPs, and is composed of approximately twenty to thirty elected members; the function of this body is to coordinate the activities of the GPs into a block plan. Lastly, the district-level body coordinates the plans of the various PS bodies in the district. This allows the individual grievances of villages to jump scale from the local to the district level.

Since the West Bengal Panchayat Act in 1973, the GS system has been implemented where village councils bear the responsibility for GP functionality. However, the institution of participatory governance was weak, as elections were not held for years and the system was dominated by local elites (Bhattacharya, 1997; Datta, 1997, 1998). However, when the Left Front gained political power in 1977, deliberative democracy was reintroduced with new vigor – elections were held with open party participation to advocate for non-partisanship. This introduced a new wave of the Panchayats (one that was free from domination by rich landlords) and created a new class of rural leadership that gave voice and representation to the poor and marginalized populations. Many land reforms were implemented including acquisition of ceiling surplus land, redistribution of land to those that were not previously land-owners, and securing rights for sharecroppers; these significantly changed the rural socio-economic landscape, with 70% of agricultural land being owned by local farmers compared to the national average of 34.3% (Datta, 2019).

The support of the rural poor by the government both encouraged the underprivileged to raise their voices and participate more, which then resulted in honing the skill of participation. In tandem with encouragement of rural populations, the Left Front government focused on implementing a literacy program which caught on very well in West Bengal as evidenced by increased literacy rates in census data (Datta, 2019).

In 1988, the responsibility of implementing development programs was shifted from the state departments to the Panchayats. Simultaneously, the budgets of the Panchayats was doubled to almost 2 million per GP, creating a new sense of local empowerment to implement the results of their deliberations.

A Summary of Empirical Findings

Out of the 37,067 Gram Sansads, 72% of them held half-yearly meetings, and of these cases, quorum was not met at 12% of them. The average attendance was 142 individuals out of which only 39 were women. The percentage of postponed meetings was very high, especially in some districts such as Dakshin Dinajpur and Howrah (Datta, 2019). The involvement of women was marginal until the self help group movement inspired positive change (Datta, 2019).

A study by Ghatak was done on a cross section of 20 villages in May 1999 to examine the functionality of Gram Sansads (Ghatak, 2002). The study presents an occupational breakdown of the individuals attending the meetings: the largest category was agricultural laborers, while the second largest group was farmers with less than 2 acres of land. Notably, only 16% of individuals that attended had more than 2 acres of land or non-farming income. This resulted in a narrow scope of discussion in the meetings and a focus on tangible problems within the community such as road repair, the installation of wells, the doling out of loans, etc rather than abstract socioeconomic and political issues. Researchers also noticed participants actively demanding new projects and making suggestions on the allocation of funds – there was even deliberation on the specific design of certain projects and their execution.

Notably, the leaders of the assemblies and the local representatives are subject to scrutiny by the people, creating a system of accountability. Organizers must answer to the criticisms of individuals and “often face allegations about the misuse of funds and selection of beneficiaries” (Datta, 2019). The process of election ensures that all parties are held accountable. Another important finding was that those who participated were usually members of a political party – those that were apolitical had a tendency to avoid participation in the GS meetings. Lastly, a study done by Datta in 2000 shows that over a third of the villagers had no awareness of the Gram Sansad system, and that attendance to meetings was considered a low priority due  to increased farm work and the notion that meetings did not influence the final decisions (Datta, 2001, 2009). This notion is grounded in the reality of many GS systems; a study done by Bhattacharya in 1998 found that the majority of decisions of the panchayats were made before the meetings by a sub-committee. Furthermore, GP members were reported for ignoring the actual deliberation and proceedings in Sansad meetings and being intolerant of opposing viewpoints.

A study done by Robert Thorlind shows that the Gram Sansads were not functioning effectively and require awareness among the marginalized classes and practical learning of democratic processes before they can become instruments for democratic accountability and participation (Thorlind, 2000).

A FOCUS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GS IN KERALA

Following in the footsteps of the Panchayati Raj of West Bengal, officials of Kerala attempted to implement the same methodology in their own state in 1996. The Communist Party of India (CPM) was in power at the time and pursued a system of empowered deliberative democracy with a focus on giving grassroots programs the resources to actually implement their ideas – under the program, 40% of the state’s budget would be reallocated from the state level to the village level Panchayats. However, the distribution of power was not implemented without regulation. Each village was tasked with producing a report that detailed the development plan using the available assets including but not limited to specified assessments of need, development reports, spending projects, supplemental financing, arrangements for deciding plan beneficiaries and monitoring of arrangements (Fung and Wright, 2003). To ensure that a focus on anti-poverty initiatives was not lost, a condition was implemented that 40-50% of funds was to be invested in some form of economic development, 40% had to be used towards social spending and slum improvement, 10% of funds had to be spent on programs to empower women, and a maximum of 30% could be allocated for roads (Fung and Wright, 2003).

Of the various regional implementations of the 73rd constitutional amendment that were implemented throughout India – deliberative democracy has seen the most success in the villages of Kerala. In conjunction with the 3 tier structure, working committees and development seminars are held to create accessible spaces of deliberation and planning (Parthasarathy, 2017). Instead of having open deliberation, those that attend the assemblies are divided into groups based on the theme of resources or committees, and sent off to deliberate until reaching a consensus on the appropriate and effective allocation of resources in the facet to which they were assigned. Furthermore, deliberation is bolstered by a variety of training programs to inform and instruct citizens on deliberative planning and effective execution of plans into public action. A study done by Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri using qualitative and quantitative data on 72 Gram Sabhas found that there was a positive correlation between the influence of the People’s Campaign in Kerala and the inclusion of women and ‘lower caste’ groups in decision making spaces. Gibson goes on to argue, based on this data, that the high level of participation by women is the reason for the effectiveness of GS in Kerala.

It is notable that while progress has been promising, there is still a long way to go before the system can be considered entirely ‘successful’: “while some villages produced what appear to be thoughtful plans with high levels of direct popular participation, many others failed to produce any plans at all. Of those plans that were submitted, many were poorly integrated and had poor credit and financing schemes, and the projects within them were sometimes ill-conceived” (Fung and Wright, 2003).

AN ANALYSIS OF EMPOWERED DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

DESIGN CONDITIONS AND THE REALIZATION OF PRINCIPLES OF EDD

The roots of democracy run deep in the institutional framework of Indian government. While this is promising for the effective implementation of EDD, we apply the theories of both Heller and Fung and Wright to assess how India as a whole, Kerala and West Bengal measure up both in terms of the enabling conditions for deliberative democracy and institutional design principles. In the following section, we will refer to India as a whole, and Kerala and West Bengal as more specifically defined subsets.

First, we examine Heller and Rao’s three enabling conditions for participatory governance (1) a strong central state capacity, (2) well developed civil society, and (3) an organized political force with strong social movement characteristics. India, Kerala and West Bengal all have a strong central state capacity in terms of resources and institutional framework (Heller and Rao, 2015). While Kerala and West Bengal have resources that work towards a more developed civil society such as literacy programs and women’s empowerment groups, the same cannot be said for India as a whole. While some regions in India might have a well developed civil society, it is not with certainty that the whole country can be said to meet this criterion. Regarding Heller’s third criterion, a political force with strong social movement characteristics, Kerala was backed by the CPM and West Bengal’s democratic movement was powered forward by the Left Front. Citizen participation in the deliberative bodies has been influenced by social movements in both Kerala and West Bengal, for example the People’s campaign for including women and ‘lower caste’ groups in decision making spaces in Kerala, and the women’s self help group movement in West Bengal. However, the same propensity for social movements cannot necessarily be said for India as a whole. Therefore, both Kerala and West Bengal fulfill all of Heller and Rao’s 3 enabling conditions, while India as a whole only fulfills the criterion of having a strong central state capacity.

Concerning the design principles for EDD delineated by Fung and Wright, the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution ensure the devolution of public decision making authority, resource distribution and the creation of new state institutions (such as governing bodies) to support and guide the implementation of EDD. The three tier structure ensures funding is delegated to the village panchayats themselves resulting in the devolution of decision making power and authority. Furthermore the middle tier body (mandal panchayat) works to process plans and evaluate them from perspectives of social welfare, financial constraints and area development, and the top tier body (gram sabha) functions as a moderator and regional coordinator – this system serves to provide support and guidance through structure. Therefore India, Kerala and West Bengal all meet the design criterion. However, it is not enough to meet the design criteria if design does not result in the effective execution of the principles of EDD. Table 1 details how the principles of EDD are realized in each of the 3 implementations delineated in the prior section.

Table 1. The fulfillment of the Principles of EDD in India, Kerala and West Bengal.

In India as a whole, the Gram Sabha system was not able to obtain a focus on tangible problems, as it could not effectively establish village level priorities. In some cases the involvement of individuals and relevant officials could be considered successful , for example in the case of the Devadasi women, where the voices of the marginalized were amplified in institutional settings resulting in tangible changes. On the other hand, census data insinuates no correlation between meeting attendance and land ownership, meaning that there is no tendency for poorer or more marginalized groups to be involved in deliberative democratic processes (Datta, 2019).

In Kerala specifically, all three principles of EDD are satisfied. Training programs and the division of the deliberative body into groups ensures a focus on tangible and real problems in a variety of relevant areas. Furthermore, the regulations enforced on the allocations of funds to specific anti-poverty and development initiatives further hone the scope of the issues at hand by using funding to designate what warrants importance. The involvement of individuals affected by issues can be realized as the inclusion of women and lower caste groups via the People’s Campaign. Lastly, the use of deliberate development is well guided and is obtained through the use of supplemental working committees, training programs and development seminars held to create accessible spaces of deliberation and planning, which serve in an almost didactic manner.

In West Bengal, the largest category of attendees was agricultural laborers and only 16% of individuals that attended had more than 2 acres of land or non-farming income, which resulted in a narrow scope of discussion and a focus on tangible problems (Ghatak, 2002). Since the land reforms instituted by the Left Front including land redistribution, rural farming is a predominant occupation amongst villagers. Notably, the largest category of attendees being agricultural laborers speaks to the fact that the involvement of relevant individuals was obtained. Lastly, West Bengal somewhat meets the criterion of using deliberative development to derive solutions to the issues presented. On one hand researchers noticed participants actively demanding new projects and making suggestions on the allocation of funds, including deliberation on the specific design of certain projects and their execution. On the other hand, GP members were reported for ignoring the actual deliberation and proceedings and being intolerant of opposing viewpoints.

Both Kerala and West Bengal meet all 3 of Heller and Rao’s criterion for enabling deliberative democracy while India as a whole does not necessarily meet the conditions of having a well developed civil society and a political force with strong social movement characteristics. Since the institution of deliberative democracy in India as a whole meets Fung and Wright design principles, while only Kerala and West Bengal come close to realizing the principles of EDD in practice, we can perhaps understand how the nature of society and political structure is integral to the translation of the design criterion of EDD into actual principles. Well developed civil society and a political force with strong social movement characteristics go hand in hand in shifting focus to specific and real problems. In both the case of Kerala and West Bengal, social movements have proven effective in involving marginalized groups which narrows the scope of issues discussed, and strong political forces have been integral in empowering marginalized groups which results in increased participation. Castells proposes the idea that social movements resist different facets of imposed identity; in the case of India social movements have the potential to incite individuals to redefine their identity from powerless to empowered as it pertains to their relationship with the state and the power they hold in producing institutionalized change (Castells, 1997). With these criterion failing to apply to India as a whole, but to Kerala and West Bengal in particular, we can see the extreme importance that these criterion bear in cultivating an environment where EDD can be effective. While West Bengal has some issues in the use of deliberation as a tool to derive solutions to issues, these can be attributed more to discrepancies in power amongst members of the deliberative body than the criterion for effective EDD.

AN ANALYSIS ON THE EFFICACY OF EDD IN INDIA

While it is useful to compare implementations of EDD within India, the actual efficacy of such deliberative bodies must be considered with respect to some metric. In order to understand how effective institutionalized participatory governance is in India, Kerala and West Bengal, we will use Fung and Wright’s six metrics for effective EPG. Table 2 details how each of the 3 case studies measures up using these criteria.

Table 2. The analysis of EDD in India, Kerala and West Bengal using the metrics presented by Fung and Wright

Notably, deliberative democratic institutions have been present in the infrastructure of Indian government throughout history. The 73rd and 74th amendments sought to improve the efficacy of EDD systems by providing more structure to the processes. Therefore, we cannot say that the outcomes of the processes are significantly improved from a prior system, but can only understand that through increased support and devolution of power, such as increased allocation of funds, and the effective implementation of the 3 tier structure, there is more promise for favorable outcomes. This criterion was excluded from the table for these reasons. Similarly, the metric of how genuinely deliberative EDD processes are was also excluded as this was detailed to some extent in the previous section and overlaps with the third criterion for effective EDD, or the extent to which deliberation was used as a tool for problem solving.

Examining the remaining four metrics, we can see some similarities in unfulfilled criteria. In none of the 3 geographical regions were decisions concretely translated into action (Thorlind, 2000; Datta, 2019; Bhattacharya, 1998). In Kerala for example, of the plans that were submitted many were poorly integrated with credit or financing schemes that were inadequately structured (Fung and Wright, 2003). There are some cases in which Kerala has seen great successes. One such example is the village of Punsari, which has made use of institutionalized EDD to provide the village with plumbing, roads, street lights, toilets in every house, and 15,000 houses with connected water facilities amongst its most basic amenities (Joshi, 2018). However, such extraordinary results cannot be generalized to the whole region. It is important to note here that though the structure for deliberative bodies are in place in all three regions, often meetings are not attended, are postponed or do not obtain quorum, decreasing their efficacy in functioning as efficient institutions for empowered governance (Datta, 2001, 2009; Das, 2015).

While the 3 tier structure is in place to ensure that deliberative bodies are both monitored and able to monitor the implementation of their deliberative outcomes, the data suggests that they do not function effectively (Thorlind, 2000). Therefore, in India, Kerala and West Bengal we can say that while resources are available to result in actual implementation, there seems to be failure in execution. Similarly in evaluating the extent to which reforms coordinate the action of local units and diffuse innovations, we can reconcile the institutional structure with actual results. While the intermediate and top tier bodies within the 3 tier framework serve to meet this exact criteria, the lack of consistency in meetings and participation (with attendance being as low as 13 percent at meetings) coupled with the lack of accountability placed on these bodies results in inconsistency (Das, 2015; Datta, 2003b). In both Kerala and West Bengal, deliberative and monitoring bodies function relatively more efficiently than on the regional scale, leading to a somewhat effective outcome when it comes to coalescence and the diffusion of innovation. Later on, we will examine these challenges with respect to the drawbacks of EPG. Lastly, we consider the extent to which deliberative processes increase the deliberative capacity of the participants. While the fulfillment of this metric is inconclusive for India as a whole, West Bengal has literacy programs and policies in place to hone deliberative skills and Kerala supplements the triple tier system with working committees and development seminars (Fung and Wright, 2003).

However, the key to Kerala’s relative success might be the large-scale organizational and administrative effort that was engendered to support the ground up approach of participatory democracy. This is exemplified by developing individual villages’ capacity to conduct rural assessments and formulate development plans. The “development seminars” previously discussed had over 300,000 participants, and actual planning processes have involved more than 100,000 volunteers to develop village projects and more than 25,000 volunteers to combine projects into village level plans (Fung and Wright, 2003). The appropriate training and education of individuals coupled with empowerment through budget reforms work to be driving forces for EPG.

Therefore, we can conclude that while institutionally the design of systems of empowered deliberative democracy in India seem to embody the principles of EDD, they do not result in widespread effective implementation according to Fung and Wright’s metrics. Returning to Gaventa’s six propositions for empowered deliberative democracy, we can see two clear factors that could contribute to these flaws in execution. The first is the failure to close the gap between the poor and institutions that govern their lives. While social movements and political forces can empower marginalized groups and encourage participation, there is still a lot of abstraction between individuals and an understanding of the nature and structure of deliberative bodies and their potential. Furthermore, governance may seem like a rather inconsequential subject to most individuals that deliberative bodies actually seek to serve, resulting in lower attendance in meetings and a lack of accountability. The second is building relationships between citizens and their local governments through new forms of participation, accountability and responsiveness. It seems to be the case in India as a whole, that deliberative democracy has created two one-way channels between the government and local deliberative bodies that run parallel to one another but do not seem to intersect to produce appropriate implementation. On the institutional side, framework and structure for deliberative bodies as well as the devolution of funds and power to the local level exists. Conversely, on the village level, in some cases plans are being drawn up to bolster development initiatives and counter local issues. However, it seems like a lack of structure and accountability for implementation causes the rift in effective communication between the local and regional bodies from both a top down and a bottom up approach.

DRAWBACKS OF EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN INDIA

In this section we will delve into the drawbacks of EDD as they manifest themselves in the case studies discussed above, measures taken to address these drawbacks and their efficacy. One of the main drawbacks of deliberative processes is vulnerability to power domination by certain factions. In Kerala, this is not reported to a notable extent. On the other hand in West Bengal, it was found that those who participated were usually members of a political party (Datta, 2019). The intolerance of village-level leaders to ideas of opposing party viewpoints led to decreased participation by apolitical individuals and those affiliating with other parties. No measures have been taken in West Bengal to address this drawback, which has the potential to significantly affect the efficacy of deliberative processes in this region. In Kerala, it is possible that the presence of development seminars and training on how to go about effective deliberation led to a decrease in this kind of power asymmetry. Another significant drawback in EDD is unrealistic expectations of commitment from individuals. This manifests itself to a large extent in West Bengal where census data (used by Datta) shows that over a third of the villagers had no awareness of the Gram Sansad system, and that attendance to meetings was considered a low priority due to increased farm work and the notion that meetings did not influence the final decisions (Datta, 2019).

Robust inclusion processes have the potential to remedy both of the issues discussed above. If those from other political parties and apolitical individuals feel that their voices would actually lead to meaningful change, this might encourage participation. Furthermore reimagining how individuals are included in these processes might alleviate apathy. We can look to Kerala for an example of robust inclusion. Social movements such as the People’s campaign fostered inclusion of women and other marginalized groups in decision making spaces. This emphasizes Castells argument of the power of social movements in the involvement of marginalized groups – it “shows the breaking of traditional molds by global trends of identity politics” as groups that are used to being told that they don’t belong in empowered and decision making spaces are redefining their identity of belonging with the force of social movements (Castells, 1997). The drawback that we will discuss next is unequal power of participants due to asymmetrical access to information and class inequality. In some cases, deliberation itself leads to a sense of community. For example, in India as a whole regular GS meetings reduced casteism and communalism due to increasing discourse between individuals across all castes and communities (Datta, 2019). In other instances – West Bengal for example – literacy programs were implemented to combat asymmetrical information due to circumstances of inequality such as poverty. While the educational programs themselves were effective in increasing literacy rates, this did not necessarily combat the issue of inequality in debate, as it pertained more to political polarization. Lastly, in the case of Kerala, the combination of seminars, training programs and community outreach engagement seemed to alleviate issues of asymmetry and class inequality.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, while the potential for deliberative democracy is strong in India, there are many steps that can be taken to increase its efficacy. Drawing from results in Kerala (Fung and Wright, 2003), it can be said that increased structure (specifically, guidelines for distribution) in spending is beneficial in narrowing the scope of issues addressed and allowing for factions to skew interests in their favor. Specifying percentages of allocated funds that can be spent on specific development issues, as was done in Kerala, such as women empowerment or slum improvement, ensures that plans are focused and highlight areas of importance (as recognized by the designation of funds). Furthermore, the implementation of grassroots level outreach programs and development seminars fosters local involvement and encourages participation, working towards robust inclusion. Robust inclusion processes include concepts such as targeted outreach programs, general public awareness programs, and educational tools such as workshops on deliberation and moderation of meetings; they have great potential to solve issues of apathy and power asymmetry due to unequal opportunity or circumstance.

Conversely, the studies in West Bengal show just how detrimental political polarization in a body can be to deliberative processes. While the structure and principles of EDD are very similar in Kerala and West Bengal, the latter has seen far less success due to apathy and asymmetry in power engendered by strong affiliations with political parties and their ideals. Potential solutions to issues of power usurpation by political parties and the lack of inclusivity are articulated by the idea of counter-publics and critical mass posed by Hernandez-Medina when examining participatory budgeting in Sao Paolo. Medina delineates the concept of counter-publics, described by Fraser, “‘the existence of multiple publics while focusing on ‘subaltern counter-publics’, i.e. those constituted by groups marginalized from the mainstream political arena [and] function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics’” (Hernandez-Medina, 2010). Social movements as described by Castells have the potential to function in engendering and mobilizing counter-publics in deliberative democratic processes, as they seek to redefine identity politics of marginalized groups to be empowered. However, in order for counter-publics to function effectively in empowering marginalized groups in deliberative processes, Medina argues a that critical mass of new actors must be met as, “members of the minority group are less likely to risk being ignored or further marginalized if there are not sufficient allies at the table and because in diverse groups, members of the majority are more prone to check their own and others’ prejudices” (Bowers et al. and Summers, 2006 cited in Hernandez-Medina, 2010). This can be exemplified by the large impact of social movements in increasing the participation of women, and ‘lower caste’ groups that are otherwise sidelined in EDD.

Lastly, in all three regions, the results of the studies show that the links between the deliberative bodies, even at the higher tiers and the government lack accountability. This results in the deliberative bodies being empowered, but not accountable for the effective execution of their plans. The issue might benefit from increased institutional structures put in place to bolster implementation, and guidance on appropriate financing schemes and execution. This is articulated by Heller and Rao on bringing deliberation into the developmental state; they state that while, “deliberative processes are key to legitimating the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, effective bureaucracies play a key role in legitimating deliberative processes. Marrying the two is one of the principal challenges to building a deliberative system into the developmental state” (Heller and Rao, 2015). Conversely, they also argue that, “capability enhancing services are always co-produced by their “recipients. The state needs their active engagement in the delivery of those services in order to ensure that they achieve their goals” (Ostrom, 1996 cited in Heller and Rao, 2015). Therefore, one one end the bureaucracy must be strengthened by more strict regulation for implementation and on the other end, social movements and the creation of effective counter-publics must work to resolve issues of apathy and create robust inclusion of marginalized groups in processes so that productive deliberative outcomes can be ‘co-produced’. While India has a long way to go with respect to the effective implementation of EDD, the current model shows promising results in terms of fostering an environment of change.

WORKS CITED

Silver, H., Scott, A., & Kazepov, Y. (2010). Participation in Urban Contention and Deliberation. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34, 453-477.

Thorlind, R. (2000). Development, decentrali and democracy. Copenhagen: NIAS.