11 Analysis

The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution was the first legal document in Ecuadorian history to include indigenous ideology of “good living” and the right of nature, bilingual education, and land autonomy. However, the legislation of President Rafael Correa exposes methods used to deter the development of these clauses and their implementation. In this section, I will identify and analyze the method of determent used by Correa’s government and the styles of activism used by indigenous activists.

There were many indigenous movements involving the 2008 constitution. Different indigenous organizations (and different branches within the same organization) focused on different issues of the constitution. These issues mainly fell into the categories of land autonomy, bilingual education, and the development of Sumak Kawsay and nature rights. Indigenous activists incorporated many styles of activism in their movements, many of which reflect the methods explained by Favareto and colleagues in their chapter titled “How styles of activism influence social participation and democratic deliberation.” The authors explain that styles of activism are “the result of factors that can be understood through the idea of structured interactions” (Favareto et al 2013: 247). Within the structure of interactions are three major components:

1. The leader’s trajectory, through which it is possible to understand how an agent’s social properties can translate into categories to classify the social world, be disposed to action, and be injected into stocks and resources to mobilize.
2. The networks through which it is possible to understand how the relations and the resources that can be channeled through them can stretch.
3. The trajectory of the social conflict motivating these movements and the way the state regulates this conflict. Calculating the trajectory of conflict makes it possible to understand the fields of opposition engendered by the conflict, on the one hand, and, on the other, how much room there is for demands to be absorbed into the way that the conflict is drawn up (Favareto et al 2013: 247-248).

The authors explain that leadership trajectories focus on tradition and values. Conflicts of this manner heavily connect with tradition and suggest that problems orient from their suppression. The activism style typical of this form of conflict is more confrontational however, this group is more likely to bargain and use other pragmatic methodologies which makes them more likely to gain participants. Favareto labels this style as interactional as “it deals with the interaction between the social structures present in individuals as they react to and experience conflict” (Favareto et al 2013: 249).

Networks explain the cumulative resources (relations/ties) of individuals and social groups. The effectiveness of these groups is based on having both strong (relations that are frequently/ permanently utilized by activists)  and weak ties ( secondary relations to the already established “strong” ties). However, this can lead to a “hierarchy of identities” between activists within the organization. Unfortunately, this method of activism is limited to a particular range of relations and resources which “structurally limits the field of political action” (Favareto et al 2013: 249). Also, the blend between strong and weak can affect the type of activism the group will encompass. Favareto explains that “ a predominance of strong ties tends to stimulate the formation of practices and strategies of actions oriented towards intransigence when dealing with social conflict” (Favareto et al 2013: 249). The predominance of weak ties, on the other hand, “tends to conform to styles of activism that are more open to dialogue and negotiation with different groups” (Favareto et al 2013: 249). The authors label this style of activism as structural because it specifically deals with relations that individuals and their organizations have available.

Favareto et al explains that “the structure of political opportunities is strongly related to how the state regulates conflicts between different interests” (Favareto et al 2013: 250). The state regulates these conflicts through its mechanisms (legislation, policies, and programs) or through the way it “directs political dissension in a particular configuration of forces” (Favareto et al 2013: 250). Structural determinants, in this case, depending on how the state is acting (either targeted or universalist) towards the activists. A universalist approach would allow for more social groups to benefit from their policy. On the other hand, targeted policies are restrictive to the beneficiaries. Like the previous style of activism, this method is labeled as structural because it expresses the institutional role that conflict is given by the state.

Recalling the ideas presented by Favareto and colleagues, we can understand that during the rewriting of the 2008 constitution, Correa’s government used a targeted approach in their policy implementation. As mentioned in the Review of Literature, Correa’s government consulted with indigenous groups that had previously endorsed his presidency and were not openly critical of his legislation. This led to the targeted implementation of policy. As will be explained in the following sections, those who supported Correa were those who gained access to benefits while those that did not were forced to fight for the implementation years after the constitution was passed.

Depending on the specific issue, Indigenous movements surrounding the 2008 constitution utilized different methods of activism. Branches of CONAIE, as a response to the removal of indigenous intercultural bilingual schools, created a carpool system that took students to and from their new school that was miles away. They were able to do this by connecting with other indigenous community members and branches within local indigenous organizations. This established many personal connections between branches, however, this process was limited to the resources these organizations had available to them (Contrato Social por la Educación 2016).

http://https://youtu.be/4TWtjbQBo5w This exemplifies Favareto’s idea of network-based activism. In this instance, there are no hierarchies of relations due to the unofficial nature of the program. However, hierarchies of relations are an important factor that caused branches of CONAIE to become beneficiaries of Correa’s policy over others.

Conflicts about land autonomy best align with Favareto’s idea of leadership trajectory. Indigenous ideas on land conservation align with their spiritual connection with the land. Extractivism is causing grave environmental damage, a threat to indigenous spirituality, and infringes on their land autonomy. As a result, many protests against extractivism occurred. This is representative of the confrontational nature of this style of activism. Besides, the incorporation of Sumak Kawsay (good living) and the promise of the consultation were the results of a Constituent Assembly. These groups of indigenous leaders negotiated with the state for the inclusion of these policies because “many indigenous activists believed that they could most effectively influence the content of the new constitution by working within Correa’s government (Becker 2010: 50).

The styles of activism utilized by Indigenous movements surrounding the writing of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution align with Favareto et al’s analysis. The organizations with which Correa worked exposed the targeted policy within his administration which led to indigenous opposition. In the following sections, I explore how these methods of determent contradict the 2008 constitution and silence indigenous voices.

Sumak Kawsay and The Rights of Nature

Chapter two, Section two of the Constitution recognizes the rights of nature and promotes the indigenous ideology of Sumak Kawsay (good living). This law incorporates many social and economic rights that are considered essential to good living, including rights of food, health, housing, education, water, and culture (Scofield 2017: 28). The state promises to

… promote, in the public and private sectors, the use of environmentally clean technologies and non-polluting and low-impact alternative sources of energy… The development, production, ownership, marketing, import, transport, storage, and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, highly toxic persistent organic pollutants, internationally prohibited agrochemicals, and experimental biological technologies and agents, and genetically modified organisms that are harmful to human health or that jeopardize food sovereignty or ecosystems, as well as the introduction of nuclear residues and toxic waste into the country’s territory, is forbidden (Correa 2008).

Conservation, the protection of ecosystems, biodiversity and the integrity of the country’s genetic assets, the prevention of environmental damage, and the recovery of degraded natural spaces (Correa 2008) are all declared matters of public interest. Article 27 mandates that the economic structure of the state be based on Sumak Kawsay which represents that non-indigenous groups were willing to consider an indigenous way of life (Scofeild 2017: 66). However, the extractivist model adopted by Correa’s government contradicts the rights of nature and infringes on indigenous rights to land autonomy and consultation

Land Autonomy

Chapter four, Article 57 of the constitution states that Indigenous communes, communities, peoples, and nations have the right to

… free prior informed consultation, within a reasonable period of time, on the plans and programs for prospecting, producing and marketing nonrenewable resources located in their lands and which could have an environmental or cultural impact on them; to participate in the profits earned from these projects and to receive compensation for social, cultural and environmental damages caused to them. The consultation that must be conducted by the competent authorities shall be mandatory and in due time. If the consent of the consulted community is obtained, steps provided for by the Constitution and the law shall be taken (Correa 2008) [translated by Edmund A. Walsh].

Although these promises of consultation are seemingly progressive, Article 57 became a topic of much controversy. In January of 2009, the interim congress passed a new mining law. President Correa asserted that the law would create more jobs and help grow the economy however, indigenous populations complained that this law wouldn’t require approval from indigenous communities before beginning extraction. In addition, they argued that this law is unconstitutional because it contradicts clauses in the constitution that protect the Rights of Nature and indigenous rights (Becker 2010: 58). The CONAIE called Correa’s actions “neoliberal and racist” and responded to this law with nationwide protests. According to Becker (2010: 58), “ activists shut down highways in the southern highlands and the eastern Amazon.” Unfortunately, Correa’s government passed the law and went forth with mining extraction.

The implementation of this law led to the governmental support of three large-scale mining projects in the southern Amazonian Highlands. These projects include the Mirador, Panantza- San Carlos, and Fruta del Norte mining projects. These lands are a part of the Cordillera del Condor ecosystem and are inhabited by indigenous Shuar nationalities and “landless” settlers who have developed “socio-spatial relations” and a “unique cultural identity” (Vela- Almeida 2017: 129). Vela- Almeida (2017) exposes Correa’s supposed post-neoliberal approach to government and development as a system that “… highlights efforts to generate revenue for social welfare and poverty alleviation while regulating mining influence in the locality and securing environmental protection” (Vela- Almeida 2017: 126). However, an economy that relies on extractivist principles conflicts with the ecological and political principles presented in the Ecuadorian Constitution.

The displacement of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands is a direct violation of Chapter four, Article 57 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, however, Shuar nationalities have been removed from their lands for the Cordillera del Condor mining projects. Although Shuar nationalities do not historically have ancestral lands, due to internal warfare on “otherwise vast and unrestrained space” (Vela- Almeida 2017: 133), they are not exempt from the security that land tenure offers. Granting the Shuar nationalities their lands would make it easier for these nomadic people to establish their autonomous communities to accumulate wealth and create jobs. This would result in a greater general livelihood of the Shuar people. However,

Livelihoods continue to be transformed since colonization to an economy of cash crops, livestock production, and increasingly extractive industries. Thus, when understanding the productive transformations in the Cordillera del Condor another contradiction appears concerning the precepts of post-neoliberal principles. Livelihood disruption, proletarianization, and land accumulation for national economic interests, regardless of whether they are promoted for poverty alleviation, ultimately represent the most locally recognizable form of territorial, cultural, and economic dispossession for people depending on those lands for survival. If poverty alleviation is a primary objective of the national government through the support of economic well-being, then the ongoing annihilation of livelihood autonomy and the plural ways of managing resources requires exposition to better relate well-being with a social agency to envision alternative futures (Vela- Almeida 2017: 133).

Martinez- Novo (2014: 119) argues something similarly. She asserts that extractivist governments “… desperately need and take advantage of the profits generated by these activities and claim that they use the revenues to improve the standard of living for the national population.” She goes on to mention that “governments also confront social movements in frontier areas with increasing intolerance and in some cases with violence, and tend to criminalize and stigmatize those who oppose extraction” (Martinez- Novo 2014: 119). In response to the nationwide CONAIE mining protests, Correa “… responded in a heavy-handed fashion, deploying the military to stop the dissidents and accusing the protesters of being unpatriotic saboteurs.” The President claimed that “…infantile environmentalists were creating obstacles to economic development.” As a result, 45 CONAIE mining protesters were arrested and charged with terrorism for trying to disrupt petroleum extraction (Becker 2010: 57). This is not the last time President Correa attempts to paint indigenous activists out to be terrorists, unpatriotic, or saboteurs. Correa often referred to indigenous people as “infantile” and treated them as recipients of policy rather than actors in policy creation. The tactic of discrediting the indigenous populations while belittling their activism is a trend seen in other post-constitutional conflicts as well.

Bilingual Education

DINEIB (National Directorate of Bilingual Education) was established in Ecuador in 1988 after adopting EIB (Intercultural Bilingual Education) as an official state structure. During its time, indigenous organizations had full autonomy over the national and local DINEIB administration (Gustafson 2014: 83). Indigenous populations were able to elect DINEIB leaders, administrators, and educators. After the 2009 CONAIE mining protests, Correa’s government abolished the right of indigenous organizations to elect the leader of DINEIB and instead elected the Minister of Education to manage intercultural bilingual education (Martinez- Novo 2014: 115). This decision violates the concept of indigenous autonomy and intercultural education included in the 2008 Constitution.

Chapter four, Article 57 of the Constitution promises indigenous populations the right

To develop, strengthen and upgrade the intercultural bilingual education system, on the basis of criteria of quality, from early stimulation to higher levels of education, in conformity with cultural diversity, for the careful preservation of identities, in keeping with their own teaching and learning methodologies. A teaching career marked by dignity shall also be guaranteed. Administration of this system shall be collective and participatory, with rotation in time and space, based on community monitoring and accountability (Correa 2008) [translated by Edmund A. Walsh].

Correa’s decision to abolish the right of indigenous people to choose the DINEIB administration is a direct violation of the constitution. However, in 2011, Correa’s government implemented a new Organic Law of Intercultural Education (LOEI) that made the government obligated to “progressively include in the curriculum the study of at least one ancestral language as well as the systematic study of non-official national realities, histories, and local knowledge” (LOEI, Title I Article 5, Letter 1). This law sparked controversy with indigenous organizations as well. The law defines interculturalidad as “… recognized and understood as coexistence and interaction inequality that promotes unity in diversity and mutual appreciation among individuals, nationalities, and peoples in the national and international contexts” (Martinez- Novo 2014: 116). However, there are several tensions with this law: (1) centralization of decision making in the executive that assumes responsibility for the implementation of interculturalidad throughout society; (2) an appropriation of interculturalidad for the nation and a blurring of the meaning of the term at the expense of the interculturalidad as a specific political project of indigenous peoples; (3) criminalization of protest within the educational system, which is one of the most politically active sectors of civil society in Ecuador; and (4) the use of the word in “ancestral” throughout the law to refer to indigenous language and culture, relegating indigenous knowledge to the past in classical indigenista fashion (Martinez- Novo 2014: 116). There is much debate over the implications of the law and whether or not it is treating indigenous populations as participators in policy creation.

A Kichwa linguist, an authority in the Intercultural Bilingual System in the Province of Imbabura and a member of FENOCIN, grapples with the positives of LOEI. He recognizes the significance of an education law that emphasizes the importance of intercultural bilingual education and praises the requirement of including the teaching of ancestral languages. However, Martinez- Novo (2014: 108) argues that this law exposes the appropriation of indigenous logic while treating indigenous peoples as unable to design and implement policies. Another indigenous intellectual weighed in on the conversation by stating

With all sincerity, I must respond that I do not like that law. I say this not because I am against Officialism [Correa’s government], but because this is a law that does not respond to the real needs of Ecuador. Let me tell you the process of creation of this law. By request of the actors of the system of intercultural bilingual education, there was a process of pre-legislative consultation. In this process, by consensus, we requested that intercultural bilingual education was considered an autonomous system from the administrative, technical, and financial point of you. This proposal was not taken into account. The government argued that pre-legislative consultation with indigenous people is not binding. It is unbelievable the way they have treated us. Well, the term “intercultural” was created by academics, but we appropriated it in Intercultural Bilingual Education, trying to dialogue, trying to look for mutual respect by the people who live together. However, today that term has been appropriated by Officialism as a political symbol. For me, interculturalidad is not an abstract term. It is concrete. Ninety percent of the teachers do not agree with the system that they are implementing in Ecuador. The only ones who agree are those who have become part of Officialism because one of the strategies of this system has been to divide and destabilize the organized social systems and to divide even with greater strength the indigenous movement. Many leaders have been bought in exchange for jobs (Martinez- Novo 2014: 117).

The CONAIE 2009 extractivism protests began a campaign led by the Correa administration against indigenous organizations. In response to the backlash received from LOEI, in one of his Presidential speeches, Correa asserted that “what legitimacy does CONAIE have? … We, the majority must decide how we want to organize and how we want to live. And a few stone-throwers should not impose their will. Thirteen million Ecuadorians should rise against these troglodyte attitudes that want to keep our country in the past … What CONAIE does is not resistance; it is aggression (Martinez- Novo 2014: 119).

Labeling indigenous groups as “troglodytes” and “infantile” is an attempt to discredit and invalidate indigenous organizations’ ability to make decisions. This rhetoric insinuates that indigenous people can’t be actors but compliant receivers of policy and is an example of the paternalistic governing style of Correa’s administration. Focusing on the rights of the “majority” (rich white and mestizo Ecuadorians) reveals the technocratic principles of the government as well. The disconnect between indigenous populations and the technocratic government facilitates the conflict between the two groups. However, technocratic paternalism is affecting grassroots indigenous organizations.

Correa’s employment of the targeted government created technocratic grassroots leaders that are disconnected from their communities. As previously mentioned, Correa’s government benefited organizations and groups that were not openly critical of his policies. In addition, as mentioned by the Kichwa linguist, Correa’s government coerced and forced indigenous groups into compliance by offering employment opportunities. For example, A community member was not happy with Correa because of the raised cost of living but had to attend one of President Correa’s speeches for reasons of accountability to the Ministry of Education, because he is a teacher. Even though he disagrees with Correa’s ideology associated with intercultural bilingual education, he had to go see the President speak because of the things he receives (Martinez- Novo 2014: 111). Novo (2014) notes that this phenomenon affected the indigenous movement in intimate ways

… for example, Marlon Santi, former President of CONAIE, became a radical opponent of Correa’s government and was harassed in government television propaganda for opposing the government’s natural resource policies. Meanwhile, his first cousin Carlos Viteri, Executive Secretary of the Institute for Regional Eco- development of the Ecuadorian Amazon (ECORAE), a government institution financed by oil company taxes, has been accused of distributing subsidies to increase support for the government among Amazonian peoples… A Shuar assemblywoman spoke at a February 2010 meeting of the Shuar Federation against government support for mining and oil companies, as well as against the harassment of indigenous people by the government. Her brother, meanwhile, was a government delegate for the Ministry of Culture in the province of Morona Santiago and organized a government-friendly counter- demonstration. (Martinez- Novo 2014: 111-112).

While harassing those that are vocal about their opposition, Correa simultaneously worked closely with others that agreed with and/or were willing to comply with his policy for economic gain. However, the relationships that developed between Correa’s government and indigenous peoples or groups were unbalanced and disposable. Martinez- Novo (2014: 112) explains that as the Citizen’s Revolution consolidated and polarization increased some of these indigenous allies have been marginalized from the ruling coalition. As a result, the Shuar assemblywoman’s brother had to leave his job at the Ministry of Culture and the Comptroller of Correa’s government called for the impeachment of Pachakutik’s governor (Martinez- Novo 2014: 111). This constant fluctuation between supporting and not supporting indigenous organizations creates a broader power imbalance between the working class indigenous population and the technocratic government. This relationship insinuates that “ ambivalences or outright opposition will not be tolerated. At the same time, this strategy constructs indigenous people not as actors (who may give their support at times but with whom the government must negotiate) but as obedient subjects” (Martinez- Novo 2014: 111). The disconnect between the technocratic government and the conversion of grassroots leaders to technocrats facilitated the oppressive paternalistic society forced upon indigenous populations.