10 Case

The 2008 Ecuadorian constitution is the twentieth to be written since the nation gained its independence in 1830. In his article, “Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a new Constitution in Ecuador”, Marc Becker (2010) explores the skepticism of indigenous leaders of the intentions of Correa’s new constitution. Becker found that “Indigenous leaders questioned whether the new document would benefit social movements, or strengthen the hand of President Rafael Correa” (Becker 2010: 129). Becker then goes on to explain that

… if popular movements opposed the constitution because it did not have everything they requested, they would play directly into the hands of their traditional conservative enemies, while if they supported it they would strengthen the hand of a political force that did not embody their interests (Becker 2010: 129).

Carmen Martinez- Novo, in her article “Managing Diversity in Postneoliberal Ecuador”, examines the Correa administration and their policies and attitudes toward indigenous rights. She finds the legislation to be “contradictory and difficult to implement, or no serious attempt has been made to implement it” (Martinez- Novo 2014: 108). This can be explained by Weber’s description of the structures within a bureaucracy. Weber explains that “every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of ‘secret sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism” (Weber 1921).  Novo then explains that the government praised itself for the usage of indigenous ideology in the constitution, but failed to treat indigenous people as contributors to the policy. This is representative of paternalism, the idea that these people are incapable of managing and administering policy on their own therefore they need the guidance of the government, ideals that Correa implemented in his policy and enforced in his government.

Novo and Becker also expose measures made by the government to silence and placate indigenous groups that were vocal about Correa’s shortcomings. Novo (2014) noted that

One of the few experiences of implementation has been the hiring of 20 indigenous people, 11 Afro- Ecuadorians, and 10 montubios as low-level diplomats by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2012. Indigenous applications were processed through FENOCIN (National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations), and other organizations friendly to the government, including some branches of CONAIE that have grown closer to the government (Martinez-Novo 2014: 113).

Here, Correa’s government (several years after the passing of his constitution) hires individuals from marginalized groups to fill low-tier positions. Instead of recruiting members with varying political ideologies, Correa chose members from organizations that favored his government and political standpoints. Although this is presented as a progressive development, it is a tactic by the government to placate and ultimately silence agitated members of society. Silver and colleagues solidifies this point by asserting that “Under some circumstances, increased participation can reinforce rather than reduce inequalities between social groups” (Silver et al 2010: 455). Here the branches of FENOCIN and CONAIE, in their relationship with Correa’s government, allowed for the government to ignore commentary from those who vocally opposed Correa.

Despite the controversy surrounding the constitution and indigenous movements, indigenous organizers were the main contributors to the passing of the 2008 constitution. In his novel Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador, Becker recounts indigenous organized protests against Congress despite supporting Correa.

Pachakutik leader Gilberto Talahua contended that a constituent assembly was so important Correa should bypass Congress and order the TSE to call for a popular referendum. If Correa failed to comply with his electoral promises, Talahua pledged, Indigenous movements would stage street protests. On February 13, CONAIE together with about forty other social movement organizations marched on Congress for the legislature to take action (Becker 2012: 128).

Although they threatened to protest against Correa if his electoral promises are not kept, Indigenous organizations protested for his legislation because they recognize that this aspect of deliberation is the only method to ensure Indigenous contribution in the writing of the constitution. They also were able to identify modes of resistance that would successfully gain the attention of Congress. With the help of these organizers, the constitution was passed through Congress in 2007 (Becker 2012: 126-129). Despite his implementation and methods of domination, indigenous organizers ensured his victory.